in concreto, in individuo...

...no objects can be represented through pure concepts of understanding, apart from the conditions of sensibility. For the conditions of the objective reality of the concepts are then absent, and nothing is to be found in them save the mere form of thought. If, however, they are applied to appearances, they can be exhibited in concreto, because in the appearances they obtain the appropriate material for concepts of experience -- a concept of experience being nothing but a concept of understanding in concreto. But ideas are even further removed from objective reality than are categories, for no appearance can be found in which they can be represented in concreto. They contain a certain completeness to which no possible empirical knowledge ever attains. In them reason aims only at a systematic unity, to which it seeks to approximate the unity that is empirically possible, without ever completely reaching it. But what I entitle the ideal seems to be further removed from objective reality even than the idea. By the ideal I understand the idea, not merely in concreto, but in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone.

The Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant, "BOOK II, CHAPTER III, THE IDEAL OF PURE REASON, Section I, THE IDEAL IN GENERAL"

...experience being nothing?